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Introduction 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 is 907 pages long 
in the United States Statutes at Large.2 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act is 848 pages long.3 Though the 
number of bills that Congress passes has declined in recent years, both 
the total and average page length of those bills have increased.4 When 
a statute is several hundred pages long and incredibly complex, what 
should a reviewing court do when confronted with a single section, page, 
or clause that offends the Constitution? 
For at least 150 years, the widely accepted answer has been that 
the reviewing court should “sever” the unconstitutional provision from 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
2. See 124 Stat. 119–1025 (2010). 
3. 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010). 
4. See Christopher Beam, Is 1,000 Pages Long for a Piece of Legislation?, Slate 
(Aug. 20, 2009), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/08/is-1000-pages-
long-for-a-piece-of-legislation.html [https://perma.cc/QA93-AZFF]. 
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the rest of the law.5 These cases are “governed by the normal rule”6 
that courts should prefer partial over total invalidation of a legislative 
act. When confronted with a statute’s unconstitutional clause, a court 
must ask “whether Congress would have wanted the rest of the [statute] 
to stand . . . . Unless it is ‘evident’ that the answer is no, we must leave 
the rest of the [statute] intact.”7 
But recently this long-settled principle8 of judicial review has come 
under attack.9 Critics claim that the severability doctrine is “dubious”10 
and is “in tension with traditional limits on judicial authority.”11 They 
argue that severing an offending provision from a statute is not an 
exercise in judicial humility, but rather an unconstitutional judicial 
usurpation of power.12 
 
5. See, e.g., Warren v. City of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 99 (1854); 
Allen v. City of Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83–84 (1880) (“It is an elementary 
principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part 
unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, 
that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional 
will be rejected.”). 
6. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). 
7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 587 (2012) (quoting 
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). 
8. See Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme 
Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 76 (1937) (noting that “the Supreme Court, the 
state courts, and secondary authorities all appear to agree” as to the sever–
ability doctrine’s fundamental rules); see also Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 
207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908) (“[Severability] principles are so clearly settled as 
not to be open to controversy.”); Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2208 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & Kavanaugh, 
JJ.) (“It has long been settled that ‘one section of a statute may be repugnant 
to the Constitution without rendering the whole act void.’” (quoting Loeb v. 
Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472, 490 (1900))). 
9. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barr v. Am. Ass’n 
Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2365 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 610 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part), cert. granted, No. 19-422, 2020 WL 3865249 (U.S. July 9, 2020). 
10. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
11. Id. at 1485. 
12. Collins, 938 F.3d at 611 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The Constitution does not empower courts to delete sections of 
state and federal codes. The Founders expressly considered the possibility of 
a judicial veto, and they rejected it multiple times during the Constitutional 
Convention.”). 
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Whatever the weaknesses of the severability doctrine—and there 
are many13—it is too late in the day to discard 175 years of Supreme 
Court precedent upon which legislatures continue to rely. Severability 
analyses are entrenched in our Article III jurisprudence—at this point 
a “systematic, unbroken . . . practice”14 of federal courts.15 Opponents 
of the doctrine cannot win the day by resorting solely to first prin–
ciples.16 That said, the doctrine can and should be improved to make 
its application less political and more predictable.17 
This Note explores some such possible improvements. But first, 
Part I offers a brief history of the severability doctrine. Part II examines 
recent criticisms of the doctrine. Part III responds to the recent 
criticisms and argues that although severability principles in practice 
have left much to be desired in terms of clarity and consistency, 
severability is defensible as a doctrine. 
I. Brief History of Severability 
A. Development of the Doctrine 
Severability is nearly as old as judicial review itself. In Marbury v. 
Madison,18 the Supreme Court partially invalidated the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.19 The last clause of section 13 of the Act impermissibly 
purported to enlarge the Court’s original jurisdiction, and so the Court 
invalidated that provision while leaving the rest of section 13 intact, as 
well as the rest of the Judiciary Act of 1789.20 Though the Court did 
not use the terminology that has become common in severability analy–
ses, “everybody at that time in history, and everyone since, simply 
 
13. See infra Part III.B. 
14. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
15. Going a step further, Professor Michael Dorf has questioned whether, with–
out the severability doctrine, any provision of the U.S. Code could stand at 
all in the face of a court determination that a statute is unconstitutional. 
Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Provisions, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 303, 310 (2007) 
(“A real rule of nonseverability would treat any invalid provision of law as 
invalidating the entire legal code.”). 
16. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American cons–
titutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard 
the gloss which life has written upon them.”). 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
19. Id. at 176; 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 
140 S. Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020). 
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. 
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assumed that the provision held invalid in Marbury could be (and was) 
severed from the remainder of the Act.”21 
It is unsurprising that contemporaries never questioned that section 
13’s unconstitutional provision could be excised from the rest of the 
Act. Indeed the Supreme Court, in its early decisions, “assumed as 
obvious” that a single unconstitutional clause would not render an 
entire legislative act inoperative.22 In Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s 
Lessee,23 for example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “If any part of the 
act be unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded 
while full effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the 
constitution of the United States or of the state . . . .”24 State courts of 
last resort similarly assumed that a single offending provision did not 
necessitate invalidating an entire statute.25 
Scholars consider Warren v. City of Charlestown26 to be the first 
case in which a court held as inseverable a statute with an offending 
provision, such that the entire act must fall.27 In Warren, the legislature 
enacted a law to merge the cities of Charlestown and Boston.28 The 
law’s challengers argued that Charlestown residents were not afforded 
proper political representation in the new township.29 The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts set forth a sort of severability test by 
acknowledging that when a legislative act has both constitutional and 
unconstitutional provisions, “the parts, so held respectively cons–
titutional and unconstitutional, must be wholly independent of each 
other.”30 Thus, if the valid text is intertwined with or dependent on the 
 
21. Michael C. Dorf, Severability May Hold the Key to Obamacare’s Future: How 
Much of the Law Will Survive the Supreme Court’s Review?, Justia (Apr. 9, 
2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/09/severability-may-hold-the-key-
to-obamacares-future [https://perma.cc/6FRL-5ZPM]; see Jonathan F. 
Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933, 965 (2018) (not–
ing that section 13 “continued to exist” after Marbury and that litigants could 
still “seek mandamus from the Supreme Court” in ways not proscribed by 
Marbury). 
22. Stern, supra note 8, at 79. 
23. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492 (1829). 
24. Id. at 526. 
25. Stern, supra note 8, at 79 & n.10. 
26. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854). 
27. See Stern, supra note 8, at 80; see also Eric S. Fish, Severability as 
Conditionality, 64 Emory L.J. 1293, 1301 (2015). 
28. Robert L. Nightingale, Note, How to Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond 
Severability and Inseverability for Omnibus Statutes, 125 Yale L.J. 1672, 
1714 (2016). 
29. Id.; Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 92–93. 
30. Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99. 
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invalid provision “as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended 
them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the 
legislature would not pass the residue independently . . . [then] all the 
provisions which are thus dependent . . . must fall.”31 The court struck 
down the entire act as unconstitutional and void.32 
Warren stands for the proposition that a reviewing court decides 
whether the provisions of a partially unconstitutional act are suffic–
iently independent of each other, and considers a counterfactual: would 
the legislature have passed the legislation without the unconstitutional 
provision(s)? Other state courts of last resort adopted tests with the 
same principles, and this Warren formulation was met with widespread 
approval.33 
In Allen v. City of Louisiana,34 the United States Supreme Court 
adopted Warren’s severability formulation. Quoting Chief Justice 
Shaw’s opinion in Warren, the Court captured the essence of the 
inquiry: “The point to be determined in all such cases is whether the 
unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general scope of 
the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect 
to what appears to have been the intent of the legislature.”35 Within 
fifty years, the severability test based on legislative intent was routine.36 
Important to the discussion of the severability doctrine is Con–
gress’s subsequent use of severability clauses in statutes. Lawmakers 
include severability clauses in legislation to “guide courts” on the 
question of “whether to sever the defective provision or to invalidate 
the entire statute.”37 A typical severability clause may read as follows: 
 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 106–07 (considering and subsequently declining to sever uncons–
titutional provisions of the act). 
33. See Stern, supra note 8, at 80 & n.16 (collecting cases). 
34. 103 U.S. 80 (1880). 
35. Id. at 84. 
36. See, e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 
234 (1932) (“The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily 
defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions.”). In addition to 
legislative intent, the Champlin Court also posited that the remainder of the 
statute, absent the unconstitutional provision, must still be “fully operative 
as a law.” Id. 
37. Israel E. Friedman, Comment, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 903, 903 (1997). Friedman argues that because these clauses have 
become boilerplate, “courts all but ignore” them. Id.; see also Kevin C. Walsh, 
Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738, 744 (2010) (noting that 
severability clauses “are neither necessary nor sufficient to control the judicial 
determination of severability”). But see Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2209 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & 
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“If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person 
or circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act 
and the application of such provision to other persons and circum–
stances shall not be affected thereby.”38 These severability clauses 
evidence Congress’s “long-continued acquiescence” to the judiciary’s 
use of severability as a bedrock legal principle in adjudicating cases.39 
B. Recent High-Profile Applications of Severability Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its use of the sever–
ability doctrine in many high-profile cases—approaching the question 
of whether a statute can stand without an unconstitutional provision. 
Though the Court has come out on both sides of the question depending 
on the dispute,40 its application of the doctrine has been mostly 
consistent. Three recent examples are illustrative in an historical 
analysis of the severability doctrine: Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. Chadha,41 Alaska Airlines v. Brock,42 and National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius.43 
Chadha was concerned with the constitutionality of a unicameral 
legislative veto. By way of background, the Immigration and Nation–
ality Act as passed gave the executive branch the authority to “allow 
a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.”44 The Act 
also authorized one house of Congress to “invalidate” that decision, 
thereby reinstating removal proceedings.45 The Court held that this 
legislative-veto provision was unconstitutional because it failed the 
 
Kavanaugh, JJ.) (“But boilerplate is boilerplate for a reason—because it offers 
tried-and-true language to ensure a precise and predictable result.”). 
38. 52 U.S.C. § 30144 (2018); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 
n.8 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (collecting severability clauses). 
39. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J. concurring) (concurring with the Court’s holding that the 
President had impermissibly exceeded his executive authority in the case, 
but noting that the dispute does not arise against a backdrop of Congress’s 
“long-continued acquiescence” to the executive’s construction of its powers). 
40. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578, 586 (2012) 
(holding that although the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was 
unconstitutional, it was severable from the rest of the Act); Whole Women’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318–20 (2016) (holding that the 
Texas law’s unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the rest of 
the law). 
41. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
42. 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
43. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
44. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923. 
45. Id. 
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Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.46 The 
Court severed the offending provision from the Act,47 even though Con-
gress argued that the provision was inseverable.48 
Four years later, in Alaska Airlines v. Brock,49 the Court considered 
the constitutionality of another legislative-veto provision—this time in 
the context of airline regulation.50 At issue was the Employee Protection 
Program (EPP) that was included in the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978.51 Congress wanted to ensure that airline industry employees 
would not be unduly harmed by deregulation, and created the EPP to 
protect “employees who had been employed by a certified carrier for at 
least four years” as of the effective date of the Act.52 The Act gave the 
Secretary of Labor authority to promulgate rules to administer the 
EPP,53 but the Act provided that “any final rule issued . . . shall be 
submitted to Congress and shall become effective after 60 legislative 
days, unless during that 60-day period either House of Congress adopts 
a resolution disapproving the rule.”54 The Court, relying on Chadha, 
held that the legislative-veto provision, though unconstitutional, was 
severable from the rest of the Act.55 
 
46. Id. at 945–46, 954, 959. 
47. Id. at 959. 
48. Id. at 931 (“Congress also contends that the provision for the one-House veto 
in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from § 244. Congress argues that if the 
provision for the one-House veto is held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must 
fall.”). Notably, Congress’s argument was in stark contrast to the text of the 
Act itself, which contained a severability clause: 
Here, however, we need not embark on [a complete severability 
analysis] since Congress itself has provided the answer to the 
question of severability in § 406 of the [Act] . . . : 
“If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to 
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act 
and the application of such provision to other persons or 
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 
 Id. at 932 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2018)). 
49. 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
50. Id. at 680. 
51. See id. at 680–81. 
52. Id. 
53. Among other protections and benefits, the EPP was to aid employees by 
establishing a monthly compensation program for displaced employees and 
to require airlines to consider protected employees first when making hiring 
decisions. Id. at 681–82. 
54. Id. at 682. 
55. Id. at 680, 683. 
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One might argue that the severability doctrine’s biggest recent 
impact, at least outside of the administrative law context, was in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.56 On the 
merits, the Court considered whether two provisions of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) were unconstitutional. First, the Act’s challengers 
argued that Congress exceeded its legislative authority when it enacted 
the “individual mandate”57 that requires all individuals to obtain health 
insurance—that there was no Constitutional basis for that provision.58 
Second, the challengers argued that Congress coercively and uncons–
titutionally exercised its spending power when it conditioned states’ 
future Medicaid funding on their acceptance of the Act’s Medicaid 
expansion.59 
In a splintered decision, the Court held that though Congress 
exceeded its commerce power by enacting the individual mandate, the 
provision was justifiable as a tax.60 The Court held that the Medicaid 
expansion, however, was indeed unconstitutionally coercive.61 Because 
of this holding, the Court proceeded to a severability analysis and 
concluded that the ACA can stand apart from the unconstitutional 
provision.62 As a result, Congress may not take away funding from 
states that refuse to participate in the Medicaid expansion.63 All other 
portions of the ACA remained intact after Sebelius.64 
It is important to note also that the four dissenting justices would 
not have applied severability in the case, maintaining that the ACA 
cannot stand without the individual mandate and the Medicaid expan–
sion, calling them “pillars” of the statutory scheme.65 Because the 
 
56. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
57. See id. at 539 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2018)). 
58. Id. at 540. 
59. Id. at 542. 
60. Id. at 561 (holding that the individual mandate is not supported by the 
Commerce Clause); id. at 574 (“The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that 
certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance 
may reasonably be characterized as a tax.”). 
61. Id. at 580; id. at 681 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 585 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 626 (Ginsburg, 
J., joined by Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). 
63. Id. at 585 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
64. Id. at 588 (“Confident that Congress would not have intended anything 
different, we conclude that the rest of the Act need not fall in light of our 
constitutional holding.”). 
65. Id. at 691 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). At this point 
in the dissent, contrary to the majority’s holding, the dissenting justices had 
concluded that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. Id. at 649–69. 
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dissenting justices argued that the Act’s provisions were “closely 
interrelated” and that “it is judicial usurpation to impose an entirely 
new mechanism for withdrawal of Medicaid funding,” they would have 
struck down as unconstitutional the entire Act.66 That the Court would 
have sounded the death knell for a President’s signature policy accom–
plishment illustrates the tremendous stakes inherent in the future of 
the severability doctrine and its applicability to modern legislation. 
C. Severability and Structure in Administrative Agencies 
The severability doctrine is also prominent in administrative law, 
where constitutional challenges to agency structures can pose unique 
questions of standing and traceability of injury.67 
This past term, Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau68 presented a significant example of the importance of sever–
ability in the administrative law context. After the 2008 financial crisis, 
Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
with a single Director “who serves for a longer term than the President 
and cannot be removed by the President except for inefficiency, neglect, 
or malfeasance.”69 The Director “wields vast rulemaking, enforcement, 
and adjudicatory authority over a significant portion of the U.S. 
economy.”70 In 2017 the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to 
Seila Law, a California-based law firm.71 “Seila Law asked the CFPB to 
set aside the demand, objecting that the agency’s leadership by a single 
Director removable only for cause violated the separation of powers.”72 
The CFPB filed a petition in court to enforce the demand.73 
The Court agreed with Seila Law that the CFPB’s unique structure 
violates the separation of powers.74 After holding that the CFPB was 
unconstitutional as structured, the Court analyzed whether the CFPB 
Director’s for-cause removal protection was severable from the rest of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.75 Because “[t]he provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
66. Id. at 691. 
67. For background on the “traceability” requirement in the standing context 
see Clapper v. Amnesty International, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013) and Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–63 (1992). 
68. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
69. Id. at 2191. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 2194. 
72. Id. 
73. Id.; see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law, No. 8:17-cv-01081-
JLS-JEM, 2017 WL 6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017). 
74. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197. 
75. Id. at 2207 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ.). 
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bearing on the CFPB’s structure and duties remain fully operative 
without the offending tenure restriction,” and because “there is nothing 
in the text or history of the Dodd-Frank Act that demonstrates 
Congress would have preferred no CFPB to a CFPB supervised by the 
President,” the Court held that the offending removal protection was 
severable.76 The Court remanded the case for fact-finding as to whether 
a CFPB Director properly accountable to the President ratified the 
CFPB’s investigative demand.77 
A notable question that remains is the extent to which a litigant is 
entitled to backward-looking relief in this type of constitutional chall–
enge to an agency’s structure.78 The Court will soon take up this 
prospective vs. backward-looking remedies issue.79 In the meantime, 
questions of standing, traceability of injury, and incentives for litigants 
to bring separation-of-powers challenges remain unanswered. 
For example, suppose a shareholder in Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac objects to the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s directive that 
“Fannie and Freddie give the Treasury nearly all their net worth each 
quarter as a dividend.”80 Suppose further that the litigant has a 
colorable argument that the Federal Housing Finance Agency is uncon–
stitutionally structured as an independent agency headed by a single 
director removable only for cause.81 Our discontented litigant has every 
incentive to challenge the Agency’s action by arguing that the Agency 
is unconstitutional as structured. But assuming the Agency violates 
separation-of-powers principles, can it fairly be said that the plaintiff’s 
injury is traceable to the unconstitutional structure of the Agency? 
What about when the President—the one whose power is actually 
diminished by the removal protection at issue—approves of or sanctions 
the Agency’s policy?82 The en banc Fifth Circuit issued eight separate 
 
76. Id. at 2209; see also id. at 2245 (Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & 
Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and 
dissenting in part). 
77. Id. at 2211 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ.). 
78. See id. at 2208 n.12; id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[E]ven if the CFPB’s ratification theory is valid, Seila 
still has an injury: It has been (and continues to be) subjected to enforcement 
of an investigative demand by [a Director] who remains statutorily insulated 
from removal.” (quoting Reply Brief for Respondent at 7, Seila Law v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7))). 
79. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Collins v. Mnuchin, No. 19-422, 2019 
WL 4858934 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019). 
80. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. 
granted, No. 19-422, 2020 WL 3865249 (U.S. July 9, 2020). 
81. Id. at 568. 
82. The traceability requirement in this case splintered the Fifth Circuit. See id. 
at 586 (“The Shareholders’ injury is traceable to the removal protection.”); 
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opinions and took seventy-six pages to analyze all of the questions posed 
by Collins v. Mnuchin.83 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board84 provides another noteworthy example of the Supreme Court’s 
application of the severability doctrine in the administrative context. 
Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) and vested it with authority to enforce the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.85 Congress creatively protected PCAOB members with “dual for-
cause”86 limitations on removal—Board members could be removed only 
for good cause, and whether good cause exists was vested in the 
members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, rather than the 
President.87 The Court held that this double insulation from the 
President’s removal authority violated the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.88 The Court concluded that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could still 
remain “fully operative as a law”89 and that Congress would have 
preferred a Board with members removable at will to no Board at all.90 
 
id. at 621 (Costa, J., joined by Higginson, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he Net 
Worth Sweep is not traceable to the for-cause limitation on the President’s 
power to remove the FHFA Director.”). In this case, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the FHFA was unconstitutionally structured and severed the FHFA 
Director’s “for cause” removal protection. Id. at 595 (Haynes, J., joined by 
Stewart, C.J., Dennis, Owen, Southwick, Graves, Higginson, Costa & 
Duncan, JJ.). The court did not, however, set aside the Agency action that 
directly harmed the plaintiffs. Id. at 592–94. 
83. The case produced two majority opinions and six separate opinions. Id. at 
562 (Willett, J., joined by Jones, Smith, Owen, Elrod, Ho, Duncan, 
Engelhardt & Oldham, JJ.); id. at 591 (Haynes, J., joined by Stewart, C.J., 
Dennis, Owen, Southwick, Graves, Higginson, Costa & Duncan, JJ.); id. at 
595 (Duncan, J., joined by Owen, J., concurring); id. at 596 (Oldham & Ho, 
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 611 (Haynes, J., joined 
by Stewart, C.J., Dennis, Southwick, Graves, Higginson & Costa, JJ., 
dissenting in part); id. at 614 (Higginson, J., joined by Stewart, C.J., Dennis 
& Costa, JJ., dissenting in part); id. at 620 (Costa, J., joined by Higginson, 
J., dissenting in part); id. at 626 (Willett, J., joined by Jones, Smith, Elrod, 
Ho, Engelhardt & Oldham, JJ., dissenting in part). 
84. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
85. Id. at 484–85; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 
29 U.S.C.). 
86. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S at 492. 
87. Id. at 495. 
88. Id. at 492. 
89. Id. at 509 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)). 
90. See id. (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). 
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Consequently, the Court severed the for-cause protection, allowing 
Board members to be removed by Commissioners at will.91 
These recent cases have all given substantial treatment to the 
severability doctrine in varying contexts. More are in the pipeline and 
will soon present new and difficult questions for the Supreme Court.92 
At bottom, Article III courts have time and again analyzed whether an 
offending provision of a statute can be severed from the remainder to 
leave the rest of the law intact.93 It certainly cannot be said that 
severability analyses are “no more than a remnant of abandoned doc–
trine.”94 
II. Severability Doctrine Under Attack 
It is against this backdrop of consistent judicial practice and 
repeated historical application that the severability doctrine’s critics 
levy their attack. To be sure, severability cases are open to legitimate 
criticism that courts have improperly applied the doctrine, or have 
selectively applied the doctrine while driving cases to desired political 
outcomes.95 But a new criticism has recently emerged—one that argues 
from first principles that the severability doctrine is illegitimate as an 
Article III function. 
The primary contemporary attack on the doctrine, at least from 
the Supreme Court itself rather than from scholars, appears in Murphy 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.96 Before delving into the 
Court’s treatment of the severability doctrine in this case, some 
background information on the merits is helpful. 
 
91. Id. 
92. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (addressing 
whether the zeroing out of the individual mandate’s tax penalty makes the 
entire ACA unconstitutional), cert. granted sub nom., Texas v. California, 
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-1019); see also supra notes 78–79 and accom–
panying text. 
93. In addition to the examples provided in this section, see also, for example, 
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318–19 (2016) and 
Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 36 (2014). 
Numerous additional examples abound. 
94. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (discussing 
the Court’s considerations for when it is appropriate to create new rules by 
overruling prior cases). See also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414–15 
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (setting forth Justice Kavanaugh’s 
view of stare decisis and reliance interests). 
95. See infra Part III.B. 
96. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). What is essentially a restatement of the same argu–
ment appears in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. 
Ct. 2183, 2219–20 (2020) (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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In 1992 Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA).97 Proponents of PASPA argued that the Act 
would protect college athletes and “safeguard the integrity of sports”98 
by making it “unlawful” for government entities—and private persons 
operating pursuant to the law of a government entity—to operate 
gambling schemes based on the outcome of sporting events.99 “PASPA 
does not make sports gambling a federal crime . . . . Instead, PASPA 
allows the Attorney General, as well as professional amateur sports 
organizations, to bring civil actions to enjoin violations.”100 To account 
for already-existing gambling operations, PASPA contained grand–
father provisions for Las Vegas casinos and gave New Jersey the 
opportunity to legalize gambling in Atlantic City within one year of 
PASPA’s effective date.101 
New Jersey passed a law authorizing sports gambling, but this was 
after the time frame allowed by PASPA.102 Responding to a suit by the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, New Jersey argued that 
Congress, by passing PASPA, unconstitutionally commandeered state 
legislatures and directed them to regulate according to federal dic–
tates.103 New Jersey lost in the first round of litigation104 but then passed 
a new law which, instead of affirmatively authorizing new gambling 
schemes, purported to repeal any old prohibition on sports gambling 
that was on the books before PASPA.105 
After a new suit ensued, the Supreme Court held that PASPA 
violated the anticommandeering principle because it impermissibly 
“dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”106 Congress 
may not command “state legislatures to enact or refrain from enacting 
state law.”107 Having concluded that PASPA had an unconstitutional 
provision, the majority proceeded with a somewhat typical severability 
analysis. The Court concluded that Congress would not have intended 
 
97. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 
Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04). 
98. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470. 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2018). 
100. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470–71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2018)). 
101. Id. at 1471 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1)–(3) (2018)). 
102. Id. 
103. See id.; see generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(applying the anticommandeering principle to federal legislation). 
104. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471. 
105. Id. at 1472.  
106. Id. at 1478. 
107. Id. 
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for the remainder of PASPA to stand absent the unconstitutional 
provision.108 The majority held that severing the offending provisions 
from PASPA would result “in a scheme sharply different from what 
Congress contemplated when PASPA was enacted.”109 
Justice Thomas wrote separately to “express [his] growing dis–
comfort with [the Court’s] modern severability precedents.”110 Justice 
Thomas concurred with the majority opinion because he agreed with 
the Court’s treatment of the severability question in this case, “and no 
party [had] asked [the Court] to apply a different test.”111 That said, he 
raised several objections to the severability doctrine as a whole. 
First, and as a threshold matter, Justice Thomas argued that 
severability cannot be properly considered a “remedy” for constitutional 
violations.112 He contended that early American courts did not use 
severability because they “recognized that the judicial power is, fund–
amentally, the power to render judgments in individual cases.”113 Thus, 
because courts have no power to promulgate abstract legal rules, a 
holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular 
litigant should lead a court to “simply decline to enforce it in the case 
before them. . . . [T]here [is] no ‘next step’ in which courts inquired into 
whether the legislature would have preferred no law at all to the 
constitutional remainder.”114 
Second, and because of this institutional limitation, Justice Thomas 
argued that severability is not really a remedy but an “exercise in 
statutory interpretation.”115 As Justice Thomas is a textualist who 
rejects inquiries into legislative intent, it is no surprise that he also 
rejects inquiries into Congress’s hypothetical intent.116 And even if an 
inquiry into legislative intent were appropriate as an interpretive 
matter, Justice Thomas argued that “it seems unlikely that the enacting 
Congress has any intent on [what to do with the statute after a 
provision is held unconstitutional]; Congress typically does not pass 
 
108. Id. at 1482–83. 
109. Id. at 1482. 
110. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1486. 
113. Id. at 1485 (emphasis added).  
114. Id. at 1486 (citing Walsh, supra note 37, at 755–66); see also Seila Law v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2219 (2020) (Thomas J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
115. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Seila Law, 
140 S. Ct. at 2220 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
116. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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statutes with the expectation that some part will later be deemed 
unconstitutional.”117 
Finally, Justice Thomas argued that the severability doctrine leads 
the Court to make rulings that are “dangerously close” to “advisory 
opinions.”118 Calling the doctrine “an unexplained exception to the 
normal rules of standing,”119 Justice Thomas argued that litigants regu–
larly call upon the Court to make constitutional pronouncements on 
provisions of a statute that a plaintiff does not have standing to 
challenge. “[T]he severability doctrine comes into play only after the 
court has resolved [the dispute regarding the challenged provision] . . . . 
In every other context, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each 
part of the statute that he wants to challenge.”120 
In Seila Law, Justice Thomas again advanced his criticisms of the 
severability doctrine.121 On top of the arguments already presented in 
Murphy, Justice Thomas raised one additional attack on the sever–
ability doctrine—he argued that the constitutional infirmity presented 
by the CFPB “results from, at a minimum, the combination of the 
removal provision, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3), and the provision allowing 
the CFPB to seek enforcement of a civil investigative demand, 
§ 5562(e)(1).”122 To Justice Thomas, this “convergence” problem means 
checkmate for the severability doctrine. “When confronted with two 
provisions that operate together to violate the Constitution, the text of 
the severability clause provides no guidance as to which provision 
should be severed. Thus, we must choose, based on something other 
than the severability clause, which provision to sever.”123 In response to 
the Court’s assertion that “[i]f the Director were removable at will by 
the President, the constitutional violation would disappear,”124 Justice 
Thomas asserted that “if the Director lacked executive authority under 
the statute to seek enforcement of a civil investigative demand, 
§ 5562(e)(1), the constitutional violation in this case would also 
disappear. The [Court] thus chooses which of the provisions to sever.”125 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id.; see also Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2220 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
119. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
120. Id. 
121. See Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2219–24 
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
122. Id. at 2223. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 2209 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ.). 
125. Id. at 2224 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Justice Thomas’s argument from first principles has found support 
in recent circuit court opinions. Judges Oldham and Ho recently echoed 
many of Justice Thomas’s critiques of the severability doctrine.126 In 
Collins v. Mnuchin, Judges Oldham and Ho wrote separately to dissent 
from the majority’s remedial conclusion after the court held that the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency was unconstitutionally structured. By 
way of background, a majority of the en banc court held that the 
combination of “for cause” removal and the vesting of “full agency lead–
ership” in the FHFA director violated the Constitution.127 To remedy 
this violation, the Fifth Circuit severed the FHFA director’s “for cause” 
removal protection from the rest of the statute.128 
Judges Oldham and Ho made two points in response to the court’s 
decision on remedies. First, they argued that the court’s remedy did 
not redress the plaintiffs’ injury, which was caused by the Net Worth 
Sweep.129 Second, they took up Justice Thomas’s argument from 
Murphy and argued that severability is illegitimate as an Article III 
function.130 Their first argument—which is a disagreement with using 
severability as a remedy on the facts of this particular case131—is more 
persuasive than their second, which is more analogous to a facial 
criticism of the severability doctrine writ large. 
Judges Oldham and Ho began this section of their partial dissent 
with a citation to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Murphy and an 
echoing of his audacious claim: “[W]e do not believe Article III of the 
Constitution permits us to ‘strike’ the FHFA Director’s for-cause 
protection from the statute.”132 They criticized as imprecise the common 
vernacular of judicial review133 and blamed Chief Justice Marshall’s 
 
126. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 608–11 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) 
(Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 
No. 19-422, 2020 WL 3865249 (U.S. July 9, 2020). 
127. Id. at 591 (Willett, J., joined by Jones, Smith, Owen, Elrod, Ho, Duncan, 
Engelhardt & Oldham, JJ.). 
128. Id. at 592. 
129. Id. at 609–10 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also supra text accompanying note 80 (explaining the Net Worth Sweep). 
130. Collins, 938 F.3d at 610–11 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
131. They argued that severability in this case did not provide the plaintiffs 
with a remedy because the plaintiffs’ injury was caused by the Net Worth 
Sweep, not the unconstitutional structure of the FHFA. Id. at 609. 
132. Id. at 610 (citation omitted). Of course, reasonable minds can differ about 
whether the court should sever. See infra notes 220–226 and accompanying 
text. 
133. Id. at 611 (“[W]hen a court concludes that a statute is unconstitutional, it 
is not ‘striking down’ or ‘voiding’ or ‘invalidating’ the law. It is merely 
holding that the law may not be applied to the parties in the dispute.”). 
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decision in Marbury v. Madison134 for “obscur[ing]” the history of Article 
III judicial power.135 Finally, they insisted that “[o]ur Court should not 
add to the confusion about the judiciary’s limited powers by claiming 
to ‘sever’ a statute based on open-ended speculation about how 
Congress would have solved the separation-of-powers problem.”136 
Litigants have paid attention and have followed suit. Though its 
argument was ultimately rejected by the Court, Seila Law relied on 
Justice Thomas’s Murphy opinion to argue “it is questionable whether 
the Court even has Article III power to invalidate statutory provisions 
under the guise of ‘severability’ . . . . It would seem to exceed [the 
bounds of judicial power under Article III] for a federal court to take 
an eraser to statutory provisions . . . .”137 Seila Law cautiously hedged 
the “severability-is-illegitimate-under-Article-III” argument with a 
qualifier, cabining it to only cases where severability is unnecessary to 
provide a law’s challenger with complete relief.138 But the message is 
clear that litigants may continue to press this line of argument, 
especially because there are now likely two votes on the Court to scrap 
severability.139 
Before proceeding to defending the severability doctrine as a 
legitimate Article III function, it is important to acknowledge that 
courts indeed have been too willing to engage in severability analyses 
when severance does not grant a plaintiff relief.140 To that extent, 
Judges Oldham and Ho’s first argument in Collins is not without 
merit.141 One step further, the “convergence problem,”142 properly un–
derstood, presents real challenges to severability analyses. But improper 
or overzealous use does not an illegitimate process make. 
 
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
135. Collins, 938 F.3d at 611 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
136. Id.  
137. Brief for Petitioner at 38, Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. 
Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2019 WL 6727093. 
138. Id. Here, Seila Law asked the Court to set aside the agency action and end 
the CFPB’s enforcement proceeding against it. Id. 
139. Justice Gorsuch signed on to Justice Thomas’s separate opinion in Seila Law, 
and later wrote his own partial concurrence to criticize the severability 
doctrine. See Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barr v. Am. 
Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2365–66 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
140. See infra Part IV. 
141. See supra note 131. 
142. For an introduction to the “convergence problem,” see supra notes 122–125 
and accompanying text. 
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III. Defending Severability 
Though these attacks on the severability doctrine may appeal to 
reasonable contemporary textualist and formalistic instincts, they 
should not win the day, and the doctrine need not yield. This section 
defends the severability doctrine but also directly acknowledges courts’ 
inconsistent and incorrect severability applications. 
A. Severability Doctrine’s Legitimacy—Responding Directly to        
Justice Thomas in Murphy and Seila Law 
Courts can, and should, use severability analyses when the issue of 
what to do with an unconstitutional provision of a statute is properly 
before them. First, the criticisms of the severability doctrine start from 
a very faulty presumption—that legislatures do not plan for a court’s 
pronouncement that a statute is unconstitutional. Second, counter–
factual analyses are hardly unique to severability contexts; courts 
engage in counterfactual analyses all the time. Third, an attack on 
severability’s vocabulary offers nothing new. Finally, the Supreme 
Court should consider governmental reliance and the degree to which 
Congress and state legislatures rely on the Court’s long-settled 
severability doctrine precedents. There simply is no better alternative 
than to press forward with the severability doctrine and attempt to 
improve it rather than scrap it.143 
Start with Justice Thomas’s primary criticism of the severability 
doctrine in Murphy.144 He argues that severability is not reliable as a 
doctrine because it requires “a nebulous inquiry into hypothetical 
congressional intent.”145 After all, “it seems unlikely that the enacting 
Congress had any intent” regarding a preference between a law with 
the unconstitutional provision excised and no law at all; “Congress 
typically does not pass statutes with the expectation that some part 
will later be deemed unconstitutional.”146 
 
143. See Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency 
Design, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475, 1477 (2018) (expressing reserva–
tions about using severability in separation-of-powers cases but conceding 
that it might be “the best alternative available” in such cases). 
144. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2219–20 (2020) (Thomas J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
145. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 n.7 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part)); 
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2220 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
146. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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But doesn’t it? Is it farfetched to suppose that Congress may want 
to legislate right up to the constitutional line?147 Moreover, isn’t it 
plausible that Congress may want to exceed their constitutional auth–
ority as an invitation for the Court to draw a new line? 
Justice Thomas cites articles by Professor Walsh148 and former 
Acting Solicitor General Stern149 for the proposition that Congress does 
not pass statutes with the expectation that they will later be deemed 
unconstitutional.150 But both Walsh and Stern present their assertions 
as assumptions.151 This is not a safe assumption. Indeed, separation-of-
powers principles have long been described with reference to checking 
the ambitions of one branch of government and protecting each branch 
from the encroachment of another.152 Why, then, would we assume that 
this context is different and that legislators intend to not encroach?153 
What’s more, severability clauses generally—and especially broad 
clauses such as the clause at issue in Whole Women’s Health v. 
 
147. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 
2118, 2146 (2016) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 
(2014)). 
148. Walsh, supra note 37, at 740–41. 
149. Stern, supra note 8, at 98. 
150. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
151. Walsh hedges a bit by formulating his assertion as a possibility, whereas 
Stern expressly formulates his assertion as a presumption. See Walsh, supra 
note 37, at 740–41 (“Legislatures that enact partially unconstitutional laws 
may not foresee their constitutional flaws and may not articulate a preference 
about how to cure any constitutional flaws that they do foresee.”); Stern, 
supra note 8, at 98 (“[S]ince presumably the legislative body would not have 
enacted the statute in a form known to be invalid, would it have passed the 
law at all with the constitutional defects removed?”). It is important to note 
further that Stern is actually describing with approval the counterfactual 
formulation of the severability inquiry. Id. at 99. 
152. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” The Federalist No. 
51 (James Madison) (New York Packet, Feb. 18, 1788); see also Donald 
Applestein, Why James Madison Thought Ambition Was a Good Thing, 
Nat’l Const. Ctr. (Feb. 6, 2013), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/ 
why-james-madison-thought-ambition-was-a-good-thing [https://perma.cc 
/EZR5-6DQG]. 
153. Sometimes legislatures say the quiet part out loud. See Ariana Eunjung Cha 
& Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Alabama Abortion Law Temporarily Blocked by 
Federal Judge, Wash. Post (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/health/2019/10/29/alabama-abortion-law-temporarily-
blocked-by-federal-judge/ [https://perma.cc/NU6B-SE6B] (“The bill’s au–
thor, state Rep. Terri Collins, has said it was intended to serve as a direct 
challenge to Roe v. Wade.”); see generally C. Vered Jona, Note, Cleaning Up 
for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject the Presumption of Severability in 
the Face of Intentionally Unconstitutional Legislation, 76 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 698, 700 (2008). 
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Hellerstedt154—provide further evidence that legislatures routinely make 
suppositions about federal courts’ possible constitutional pronoun–
cements. These clauses explicitly instruct courts what to do with the 
rest of the law after the court holds that a provision is unconstitutional. 
In this day and age of “constitutional hardball”155 it is simply unrealistic 
to presume that Congress does not legislate with the possibility in mind 
that a court may later deem their bill unconstitutional. 
Setting aside the flawed premise upon which part of Justice 
Thomas’s critique of the severability doctrine rests, consider the 
broader implications of his anti-counterfactual position. To be sure, 
analyzing counterfactual scenarios is a difficult undertaking. But “[i]n 
law, as in the rest of life, we indulge, indeed, require, many speculations 
on what might have been.”156 Courts regularly, for example, consider 
counter-factuals when determining causation and remedies in tort 
actions.157 But-for causation requires a court to consider a counter–
factual—what would the state of the world be had the defendant not 
acted (or failed to act)? Indeed, isn’t the application of the “reasonable 
person standard”158 legal fiction, ubiquitous in first-year law school 
courses, an explicit call for counterfactual considerations? 
Consider another example, this time exclusive to Article III 
courts—“Erie guesses.”159 When sitting in diversity and state law 
provides the rule of decision, federal courts regularly need to predict 
 
154. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). The Court described the severability clause in the 
case as follows: 
The severability clause says that “every provision, section, 
subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in this Act, and every 
application of the provision [sic] in this Act, are severable from each 
other.” . . . [I]f “any application of any provision in this Act to any 
person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by a court to be 
invalid, the remaining applications of that provision to all other 
persons and circumstances shall be severed and may not be 
affected.” 
 Id. at 2318–19 (quoting H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013)). 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the law was inseverable, and struck down 
the abortion restrictions in their entirety. Id. at 2319–20. 
155. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523, 531 
(2004). 
156. Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 339, 342 (1992). 
157. Id. at 345. 
158. Id. at 346. 
159. See id. at 347 n.38; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938). 
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how a state court would resolve an issue if it were before them.160 Again, 
this is a counterfactual analysis—after all, there is no state law settling 
the legal issue and the federal court is called upon to consider how the 
state court would rule in the hypothetical alternative universe in which 
the issue is presented to the state court. 
More examples abound, but one additional is particularly approp–
riate here, as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly call for 
it—“Harmless Error.”161 When analyzing for harmless error, a court 
considers if the outcome of the trial would have been the same in the 
counterfactual hypothetical universe where the trial court did not err.162 
In other words, an appellate court faced with a trial court’s error must 
determine how the jury would have reacted had there been no error. 
This sounds very much like a routine severability determination once 
you substitute a legislature for a jury and a statute’s unconstitutional 
provision for a trial court’s error. 
Turning to Judges Oldham and Ho’s criticism of the vocabulary 
used in severability analyses,163 it is hard to understand why objecting 
to the use of “striking down,” “voiding,” or “invalidating” is an objec–
tion to the severability doctrine, rather than an objection to the whole 
idea of judicial review. Assuming that an argument to overturn 
Marbury v. Madison is not seriously on the table, the vocabulary attack 
does not add much to the severability conversation.164 Besides, one can 
argue that it is better to construe severability as a judicial determin–
ation that the legislature did not have the constitutional authority to 
 
160. See Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses and 
the Eighth Circuit, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1625, 1626 (2010). 
161. See Strassfeld, supra note 156, at 347 n.38; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 
162. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). 
163. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 610–11 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Oldham 
& Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, No. 19-
422, 2020 WL 3865249 (U.S. July 9, 2020). See also Seila Law v. Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2220 (2020) (Thomas J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court’s “rhetoric” when discuss–
ing severance). 
164. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2351 n.8 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.) (“The term ‘invalidate’ 
is a common judicial shorthand when the Court holds that a particular 
provision is unlawful and therefore may not be enforced against a 
plaintiff . . . . [T]he Court of course does not formally repeal the law from 
the U.S. Code . . . .”). 
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enact the unconstitutional provision in the first place165—rather than a 
judicial “re-writ[ing]”166 of the statute. 
What remains of the criticism of this centuries-old doctrine, 
reaffirmed time and again, are attacks on a court’s use of legislative 
intent as a general matter,167 comments on standing,168 and the rare 
“convergence problem” in severability jurisprudence. As to the first, 
this Note does not seek to resolve the debate about the role of legislative 
intent generally in Article III jurisprudence,169 but severability should 
not be singled out for special treatment—especially when legislatures 
often anchor their intent in text via severability clauses. The criticisms 
from standing, however, have more merit. That said, it may be best to 
consider the standing arguments as particularized against severability 
analyses in individual cases, rather than an attack on the doctrine as a 
whole.170 
The “convergence problem” presents a difficult issue, but is not as 
ubiquitous as Justice Thomas argues.171 Contrary to Justice Thomas’s 
assertions, the “convergence problem” is really not even applicable in 
Seila Law. Of course, the Director’s executive authority to seek the 
“enforcement of a civil investigative demand” is a necessary predicate 
for the legal dispute in the case—without the investigative demand the 
parties would not be in court litigating.172 This executive authority is 
necessary but not sufficient to create the constitutional problem.173 The 
 
165. See Chi., Indianapolis, & Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566 
(1913) (“That act was therefore as inoperative as if it had never been 
passed, for an unconstitutional act is not a law, and can neither confer a 
right or immunity nor operate to supersede any existing valid law.”). 
166. Collins, 938 F.3d at 611 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and diss–
enting in part). 
167. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1486–87 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
168. Id. at 1487. 
169. Justices Breyer and Scalia provide an excellent survey of each side of this 
debate. See generally Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 85–101; Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 23–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
170. For more on standing, see infra Part IV. 
171. For a discussion on Justice Thomas’s raising of the “convergence problem” 
in Seila Law, see supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text. The 
“convergence problem” presents difficulties when two or more provisions of 
a law, or multiple laws, combine to create a constitutional violation and each 
provision, standing alone, is constitutional. For an example, see infra notes 
200–213 and accompanying text. 
172. Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2224 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
173. Many other actors within the executive branch have the exact same auth–
ority to petition a court for enforcement of a civil investigative demand 
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real constitutional infirmity is caused by the Director’s insulation from 
presidential oversight.174 True enough, every factual predicate that is 
necessary to the litigants being in court may be understood to help 
“cause” the constitutional problem—but without the impermissible 
removal restriction, none of these other factual predicates are cons–
titutionally problematic. In a car accident, there can be an incalculable 
number of but-for, necessary-but-insufficient causes, including every–
thing dating back to the plaintiff’s birth. Where one provision of a law 
is always unconstitutional, like the CFPB Director’s removal protection 
in Seila Law, the Court’s severability options should be straightforward. 
Unless the constitutional infirmity truly arises from a convergence of 
provisions that standing alone are constitutional, framing a routine 
severability analysis as a “convergence problem” is a red herring. 
Finally, a brief word on reliance: Severability is not an isolated 
precedent, but rather is an oft-applied jurisprudential doctrine.175 To be 
sure, stare decisis carries less weight in constitutional cases.176 But here, 
the stare decisis considerations do not attach to an individual case, but 
to an entire doctrine.177 As such, the reliance interests are more entren–
ched here as compared to when the Court considers whether to overrule 
a single case or even a line of cases.178 And it is clear that legislatures 
rely—their regular inclusion of severability clauses evidence it.179 It is 
important to consider how drastic a departure scrapping the entire 
doctrine of severability would be.180 
 
without a constitutional problem. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(e) (2018) (FTC’s 
authority); 31 U.S.C. § 3733(j)(1) (2018) (Attorney General’s authority). 
174. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2207. 
175. See supra Part I. 
176. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
177. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (noting in an analogous 
administrative law context that asking the Court to overrule “not a single 
case, but a ‘long line of precedents’” can introduce severe instability into 
“many areas of law, all in one blow”). 
178. The Court has recognized legislative reliance as an important consideration. 
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006); see also Alexander 
Lazaro Mills, Reliance by Whom: The False Promise of Societal Reliance 
in Stare Decisis Analysis, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2094, 2103 (2017). Sever–
ability implicates what Mills calls “governmental reliance” and “doctrinal 
reliance.” See id. at 2103–04. 
179. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
180. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Seila Law recognized Congress’s reliance 
interest in the Court’s severability jurisprudence. See Seila Law v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., 
joined by Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ.) (noting that Congress “enacted Dodd-
Frank against the background of our established severability doctrine”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie 
316 
B. Addressing Courts’ Inconsistent Application of Severability 
Make no mistake: to defend severability as a legitimate juris–
prudential doctrine is not to defend courts’ use of the severability 
doctrine in all cases. The larger point is that just because courts get it 
wrong does not mean that the severability doctrine is indefensible. 
Though by no means a comprehensive account, this section will offer 
for analysis some high-profile improper applications of the doctrine. 
One way that courts can get the severability analysis wrong is by 
improperly applying existing severability principles to the case before 
them. Texas v. United States181 is such a case. 
In Texas, the plaintiffs presented a novel challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act. In short, “the Plaintiffs allege[d] that, following 
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), the Individual 
Mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
[was] unconstitutional.”182 Because Congress eliminated the individual-
mandate tax, so the plaintiffs argued, the individual mandate was no 
longer a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to tax.183 Moreover, 
they argued that the individual mandate was inseverable from the rest 
of the ACA and therefore urged the court to strike down as uncons–
titutional the entire act.184 The court agreed.185 The court held that the 
2010 Congress that passed the ACA “expressed through plain text an 
unambiguous intent that the Individual Mandate not be severed from 
the ACA.”186 
The court’s application of severability was roundly criticized by the 
academy.187 Critics from both the “left” and the “right” agree—
 
181. 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, 945 F.3d 355 (5th 
Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom., Texas v. California, No. 19-1019, 2020 
WL 981805 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2020). 
182. Id. at 585. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 598, 610. 
186. Id. at 607. 
187. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Jonathan H. Adler, Nicholas Bagley, Abbe 
R. Gluck, and Ilya Somin in Support of Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants 
at 1, Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-10011); 
Leah Litman, Supreme Court to Review Obamacare Ruling That Was a 
Sick Joke, NBC News: Think (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/think/opinion/obamacare-ruling-voiding-part-health-care-law-
joke-s-really-ncna1104976 [https://perma.cc/2G5B-NZJ3]; Erin Hawley, 
What Right and Left Get Wrong About the Court Challenge to Obamacare’s 
Insurance Mandate, The Federalist, https://thefederalist.com/2019/07/ 
15/right-left-get-wrong-court-challenge-obamacares-insurance-mandate/ 
[https://perma.cc/EZ5N-6SRA] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
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Congress did not want to repeal the ACA by implication and intended 
an ACA that operates with an individual-mandate penalty of zero.188 
To show that improper application of severability principles does 
not only apply to one side of the political spectrum, consider Whole 
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt.189 In Whole Women’s Health, the 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Texas law that 
unduly burdened the right to abortion.190 The law at issue contained 
the broadest imaginable severability clause.191 But the majority opinion 
devoted a mere four paragraphs to explaining why the severability clau–
se should not save the rest of the Texas law from its unconstitutional 
provisions.192 Justice Breyer wrote that the severability clause does not 
save the Texas law because “[t]he provisions are unconstitutional on 
their face: Including a severability provision in the law does not change 
that conclusion.”193 
This “facially-unconstitutional” language may be right to the 
extent that the severability clause tried to insulate constitutional 
applications of the law from unconstitutional applications.194 And the 
majority opinion is probably correct that the admitting-privileges re–
quirement cannot be severed case by case as it is an unconstitutionally 
undue burden in all applications. But the Texas bill also required 
abortion facilities to comply with surgical-center requirements, sweep–
ing facilities into a comprehensive legislative scheme.195 Justice Alito’s 
dissent is probably correct when it notes that the severability provision 
“indisputably requires that all surgical center regulations that are not 
themselves unconstitutional be left standing.”196 There simply is no 
compelling reason why the Court could not employ severability to strike 
down regulations that pose an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
abortion while at the same time respecting the Texas legislature’s 
clearly expressed intentions to leave constitutional provisions of the law 
in place.197 
 
188. Brief of Amici Curiae Jonathan H. Adler, Nicholas Bagley, Abbe R. Gluck, 
& Ilya Somin in Support of Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, supra note 
187, at 10–12; see also Litman, supra note 187; Hawley, supra note 187. 
189. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
190. Id. at 2310–18. 
191. Id. at 2318–19; see supra note 154. 
192. Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318–20. 
193. Id. at 2319. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. at 2351 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. 
197. Justice Alito accuses the majority of not honoring the severability provision 
simply because “doing so would be too burdensome.” Id. To be fair, the 
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Though perhaps reaching the wrong severability outcome, the 
Whole Women’s Health majority was undoubtedly correct to be 
concerned about legislating from the bench.198 Severability has at times 
been used to fundamentally change a statutory scheme.199 Courts that 
confront severability analyses should guard against this possibility. 
United States v. Booker provides one such example, and is also the 
archetype “convergence problem.”200 
In Booker, the Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment is 
violated when a judge enhances a criminal defendant’s sentence based 
on the judge’s determination of a fact that was not found by the jury.201 
Further complicating the constitutional question was that the Sen–
tencing Reform Act made Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory.202 
For Booker this meant a sentence “almost [ten] years longer” than he 
would have received based solely on jury-determined facts.203 The Court 
held that the confluence of the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
Sentencing Guidelines violated Booker’s Sixth Amendment rights.204 
A separate majority of the Court then took up the issue of sever–
ability in the remedial context. The Court used severability to change 
the Sentencing Guidelines from a mandatory to an advisory scheme.205  
majority’s opinion was a bit more nuanced, as the majority strove to not 
“devise a judicial remedy that . . . entail[s] quintessentially legislative work.” 
Id. at 2319 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)). But consider 
the ramifications of this argument. Suppose a law subjects a business to ten 
regulations, eight of which are constitutional. This is a rudimentary example, 
but it is hard to understand why a court is impermissibly legislating when it 
holds that the business may properly be subjected to the eight constitutional 
regulations and therefore severs the two unconstitutional provisions. This is 
not a case that entails a fundamental change in a statutory scheme, or even 
a “convergence problem.” To be sure, legislating from the bench can be a 
valid concern in the severability context. See infra notes 205–213 and accom–
panying text. But this hypothetical, in which a court goes through in a 
binary fashion either exempting as unconstitutional or applying as cons–
titutional a regulation, is not a case where a court’s severability decision is 
fundamentally changing a statutory scheme. 
198. See Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319. 
199. See Brian Charles Lea, Situational Severability, 103 Va. L. Rev. 735, 737 
(2017). 
200. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
201. Id. at 229 n.1 (Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, 
JJ.). 
202. Id. at 233; see also Lea, supra note 199, at 777. 
203. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235. 
204. Id. at 226–27; see also Lea, supra note 199, at 778. 
205. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, 
Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.). 
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Justice Breyer’s opinion considered the remedial decision in Booker as 
a choice between two alternatives: either “engraft” the Sixth Amend–
ment’s jury-trial requirement onto the guidelines and prohibit trial 
courts from increasing a sentence based on facts that were not found 
by a jury,206 or “make the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining 
a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s 
real conduct . . . .”207 The Court concluded that Congress would have 
preferred no act at all over a scheme that required jury fact finding for 
enhancements and that Congress would prefer an advisory scheme to 
no scheme at all.208 
But this is an aggressive application of severability that probably 
transgressed the Court’s Article III powers. As Justice Stevens noted in 
dissent, the Court’s remedy for the “convergence problem” was not to 
sever any unconstitutional provision.209 Indeed, the Court’s severability 
analysis here is best understood as creating “entirely new law.”210 The 
constitutional infirmity in the case was created by a convergence of 
statutes, each of which is perfectly constitutional standing apart.211 
Thus, the severability analysis in this case cannot rely on the “void ab 
initio” line of thought212 where a court is merely pronouncing that 
Congress did not have the authority in the first place to enact an 
unconstitutional provision of a law. As an additional matter, Justice 
Stevens persuasively argued that Congress had already considered and 
rejected the scheme that functionally results from the Court’s purported 
use of severability.213 
Simply put, and for multiple reasons, Booker represents an 
incoherent application of the Court’s severability doctrine.214 Though 
 
206. Id. at 246. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 249. 
209. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
210. Id. 
211. Id.; see also id. at 280–81. This true “convergence problem” in Booker should 
not be confused with the facts in Seila Law, contrary to Justice Thomas’s 
suggestion. See supra notes 171–174. 
212. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens explained 
the point succinctly: “When a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, that 
provision is void . . . . Here, however, the provisions the majority has excised 
from the statute are perfectly valid . . . . [Thus,] the Court does not have 
the constitutional authority to invalidate [the statute].” Booker, 543 U.S. at 
283 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
213. Booker, 543 U.S. at 291–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
214. Indeed, Justice Thomas seizes on the Booker example to highlight egregious 
applications of the Court’s severability doctrine. See Seila Law v. Consumer 
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by no means an exhaustive list, this section has made clear that courts 
have inconsistently applied severability principles. 
IV. Improving Severability 
What’s left is a jurisprudential doctrine that is necessary for a 
workable system of judicial review215 but is also subject to controversial 
applications and legitimate criticisms. Scholars have proposed various 
strategies to improve the doctrine and to guard against some of the 
inconsistent applications described in Part III of this Note. This Part 
explores some such strategies. There may not be an ideal solution, but 
the stakes are such that courts should continue to strive to improve the 
doctrine to the greatest extent possible—scrapping severability is 
simply not an option. 
Sometimes courts should punt the question. Recall Judges Oldham 
and Ho’s separate opinion from Collins v. Mnuchin.216 Though their 
broad argument against severability is unavailing,217 their argument 
against severability’s application in the particular case is persuasive. 
The Collins plaintiffs sued because they were harmed by the “Net 
Worth Sweep.”218 The plaintiffs did not “complain about the possibility 
of future regulatory activity.”219 Yet the court granted a prospective 
remedy220 and refused to set aside the agency action.221 Applying sever–
ability rather than a backward-looking remedy in Collins thus meant 
that even though “the challenging part[y] won . . . the agency action[] 
that prompted them to bring [the case] at the outset remained un–
changed by the supposedly favorable court decision.”222 
 
Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2223–24 (2020) (Thomas J. concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
215. See supra note 15. 
216. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 596 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Oldham 
& Ho, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, No. 19-
563, 2020 WL 3865249 (U.S. July 9, 2020). 
217. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
218. Collins, 938 F.3d at 609 (Oldham & Ho, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 563 (Willett, J., joined by Jones, Smith, Owen, Elrod, Ho, Duncan, 
Engelhardt & Oldham, JJ.). 
221. Id. at 594–95 (Haynes, J., joined by Stewart, C.J., Dennis, Owen, 
Southwick, Graves, Higginson, Costa & Duncan, JJ.). 
222. Hickman, supra note 143, at 1488 (discussing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) and Intercollegiate Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 73–74 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
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To avoid this absurd result, courts should ensure that a plaintiff’s 
injury in the case is both redressable by severing an offending provision 
and is fairly traceable to the unconstitutional provision to which the 
court applies the severability doctrine.223 To be sure, this suggestion 
poses unique challenges in the administrative law context, where plain–
tiffs have incentives to bring any conceivable challenge to an agency 
that has acted in a manner that harms them. The obvious drawback to 
this proposal is that courts may face a choice: either set aside, case by 
case where appropriate, agency actions initiated by unconstitutionally 
structured agencies or require that an aggrieved plaintiff show that their 
injury is actually caused by the unconstitutional structure of the 
agency.224 But when severability will result in administrative restruc–
turing, courts should prudentially defer until the proper parties are 
before it.225 This approach would also conform with the Court’s long-
held practice of constitutional avoidance.226 
 
(per curiam)). Lea defines this problem as a court’s practice of issuing 
“gratuitous severability rulings.” Lea, supra note 199, at 742. 
223. Court-appointed amicus for the CFPB tried to press this argument in Seila 
Law. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment 
Below at 21–27, Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 
(2020) (No. 19-7), 2020 WL 353477. The Court rejected this argument 
because Seila Law “is the defendant and did not invoke the Court’s 
jurisdiction.” Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2195. Seila Law “is compelled to com–
ply with the civil investigative demand and to provide documents it would 
prefer to withhold, a concrete injury. That injury is traceable to the decision 
below and would be fully redressed if we were to reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals . . . .” Id. at 2196. 
224. Ironically, this would also require a counterfactual analysis. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has rejected this option as a standing requirement. See Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512 n.12 
(2010). Revisiting this point as an “either-or” as proposed is preferable to 
scrapping the severability doctrine entirely. Alternatively, and significantly 
less likely, the Court could embrace “supplemental standing” when ruling on 
the severability of statutes. See generally Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental 
Standing for Severability, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 285 (2015). 
225. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52 (1926). This suggested approach is significantly less likely post-Seila 
Law. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2196 (“While that is certainly one way 
to review a removal restriction, it is not the only way. Our precedents 
have long permitted private parties aggrieved by an official’s exercise of 
executive power to challenge the official’s authority to wield that power 
while insulated from removal by the President.”). 
226. But see Kavanaugh, supra note 147, at 2145–49 (arguing that the Court 
should abandon constitutional avoidance). 
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Next, courts should consider severability clauses as providing more 
than just a mere presumption of severability.227 A court should regard 
a severability clause (or nonseverability clause) as dispositive to the 
greatest extent possible—unless, for example, the resulting scheme 
would be patently unconstitutional.228 By deferring to legislatures’ 
intentions that are “enshrined in a text,”229 the court is guarded from 
the attack that it is legislating from the bench. To be sure, some 
severability clauses are “boilerplate” and perhaps are not discussed or 
deliberated before passing.230 But that does not change the fact that 
severability clauses are law. At least where federal legislation is con–
cerned, the clause has made “it through the constitutional process of 
bicameralism and presentment.”231 And, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
in Seila Law, “boilerplate is boilerplate for a reason—because it offers 
tried-and-true language to ensure a precise and predictable result.”232 
Justice Kavanaugh, when still a judge on the D.C. Circuit, came at 
the issue of how to improve severability with a different, but related, 
suggestion. In making his argument for more robust protection of 
narrow applications of severability, he wrote: “[C]ourts might institute 
a new default rule: sever an offending provision from the statute to the 
narrowest extent possible unless Congress has indicated otherwise in 
 
227. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.) (“The Court’s cases have 
instead developed a strong presumption of severability.”). Justice Thomas 
seems to agree that a “strong presumption” is insufficient or abnormal. See 
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2222 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Generally, when we interpret a statute, we do not hold that the 
text sets out a ‘presum[ption]’ that can be rebutted by looking to atextual 
evidence of legislative intent.”) (alteration in original). See also John 
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 203, 206 (1993) (“Moreover, 
the Court treats severability clauses as merely creating a presumption of 
severability and thus ignores the plain meaning of the clauses themselves.”). 
228. Nagle argues that courts should defer to severability clauses unless this 
yields an absurd result or one that would defeat the purpose of the statute. 
Nagle, supra note 227 at 234. This is a good start, but may leave too much 
room for creative judging—hence the suggestion for a standard of patent 
unconstitutionality. But Nagle makes a persuasive argument, and reason–
able minds can differ here. Most recently, Justice Kavanaugh has set forth 
the inquiry thusly: “At least absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court 
should adhere to the text of the severability or nonseverability clause.” Am. 
Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. at 2349 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by 
Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.). 
229. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1487 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
230. See Friedman, supra note 37, at 910–11. 
231. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
232. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito & 
Kavanaugh, JJ.). 
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the text of the statute.”233 This default rule could stand in as a 
substitute for increased deference to severability clauses, but it does not 
carry the same weight as a default respect to text, bicameralism, and 
presentment. Nevertheless, what is important is that courts should take 
care to consistently apply whichever default rule they ultimately em–
brace. 
Finally, and specifically in the context of “convergence problems,” 
a court has no business using severability to strike from a law provisions 
that are perfectly constitutional, as in Booker.234 Courts must under–
stand that severability is context-specific,235 and should be used as a 
final resort before striking down an entire law as unconstitutional. 
Though this Note does not purport to offer a solution for every 
conceivable improper application of the severability doctrine, it has 
sought to at least continue the conversation of how to improve it. This 
is vastly preferable to scrapping a centuries-old bedrock of our legal 
system. 
Conclusion 
Severability is controversial. Moreover, the stakes are tremendously 
high.236 Further complicating the controversy is that courts indisputably 
apply severability principles inconsistently—making the entire doctrine 
vulnerable to both reasonable and unreasonable criticisms. In arguing 
that severability is too important and well-established to be scrapped 
in its entirety, this Note has attempted to concede the reasonable and 
confront the unreasonable. On the one hand, arguments that the entire 
doctrine must be abandoned as a matter of first principles are unreason–
able. But this does not save severability from reasonable, as-applied 
criticisms. 
“Constitutional litigation is not a game of gotcha against Congress, 
where litigants can ride a discrete constitutional flaw in a statute to 
take down the whole, otherwise constitutional statute.”237 Of course, 
courts would be wise to avoid gratuitous severability rulings; adopt 
robust deference to severability clauses; and avoid “severing” cons–
titutional parts of laws as a remedial bandage for a constitutional injury 
 
233. Kavanaugh, supra note 147, at 2148. Then-Judge Kavanaugh also recognized 
the legislative reliance interests inherent in severability, noting that his 
proposal would have “the additional benefit of telling Congress what to 
expect.” Id. 
234. See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text. 
235. See Lea, supra note 199, at 739. 
236. Id. at 738. 
237. Barr v. Am. Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2351 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.). 
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caused by a convergence of statutory provisions. And, to be sure, “there 
is no magic solution to severability that solves every con–
undrum . . . but the Court’s current approach . . . is constitutional, 
stable, predictable, and commonsensical.”238 The message is clear to 
those that would argue that severability is illegitimate as an Article III 




238. Id. at 2356. 
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